When armed men abducted James {whose name was changed for safety} in August 2024, his life became a cycle of fear, negotiation, and endurance. Communication with his family became his only lifeline, carried out through repeated phone calls and text messages.
At the time, those conversations were simply about survival. In retrospect, he now sees something else embedded in them: digital trails that might have shortened his captivity.
“If the authorities had access to our phones, location data, and financial records, they could have located the kidnappers faster,” he said. “The delay usually comes from the inability to access information quickly.”
His experience reflects a wider national paradox. Nigeria has invested heavily in digital identity and financial systems designed to make services more efficient and individuals traceable, yet insecurity persists.
James was among the five National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) members abducted by bandits along the Omi Alafa Road in Ifon, Ose Local Government Area of the state, who were rescued by operatives of the Ondo State Police Command.
A digital backbone for security
This reality was acknowledged on December 3, 2025, when Nigeria’s Minister of Defence, General Christopher Musa, argued that military force alone cannot defeat insecurity without a digital backbone that connects identity, finance, and security systems.
According to him, the nation’s multiple data silos, operated separately by immigration, quarantine services and other agencies, have created dangerous gaps exploited by terrorists, kidnappers, bandits, cyber-criminals and illegal mining syndicates.
“Something as simple as a unified database for all citizens is urgently needed” Musa said. “Not a situation where immigration has one, quarantine has another. Once you commit a crime, it should be easy to track and trace you. Other countries can instantly deactivate bank accounts or digital access; we must get to that point.”
His statement reflects the core idea behind Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI): interoperable digital systems that can securely and lawfully exchange data across sectors for clearly defined purposes.
Nigeria already has key building blocks in place. These include the National Identification Number (NIN), Bank Verification Number (BVN), SIM registration databases, and multiple security platforms. However, these systems largely operate in isolation rather than as an integrated ecosystem. The result is a digital landscape rich in data but weak in coordination.
The promise and limits of NIN–SIM and BVN linkages
The security crisis across Nigeria has continued despite the introduction of SIM–NIN synchronisation in December 2020. In May 2021, former President Muhammadu Buhari described the policy as critical to closing security gaps, arguing that digital identity would make it easier to identify criminals.
At the launch of the revised national policy for SIM registration, Buhari urged Nigerians to participate fully, stating that the NIN would strengthen security by enabling authorities to identify individuals more easily, including criminals.
“The NIN will cover one of the weaknesses in our security structure. We will be able to easily identify and know the personality of Nigerians. We will identify people easily, including the crooks,” he had said.
More than five years later, however, kidnappings have not declined. Abduction of Nigerians has continued, and in nearly every case, kidnappers contacted families through mobile phone lines to demand ransom.
In 2025, kidnappers collected at least N2.57 billion as ransom from their victims between July 2024 and June 2025, according to a report by SBM Intelligence. Negotiations often occurred over the same mobile networks that were meant to enhance traceability.
Former Minister of Communications and Digital Economy, Isa Pantami, who executed the NIN-SIM linkage policy, has repeatedly argued that the problem lies not with the policy itself but with its implementation. He said security agencies had failed to adequately use data generated from the NIN–SIM framework, thereby allowing criminality to thrive.
“The NIN-SIM policy has been working. However, the relevant institutions fighting criminality are to be requested to ensure they utilise it effectively when crime is committed.”
He added that, “lack of utilising it is the main problem, not the policy. While in office, I know three instances where the policy was utilised, and it led to the success of their operations.”
Interestingly, Pantami who implemented and defended the NIN-SIM linkage policy, was later involved in a highly publicised fundraising effort in January 2024 to support the payment of a ransom for abducted girls in the Bwari area of Abuja. In a post on his social media account, he confirmed that a friend had pledged N50 million toward the ransom demanded by kidnappers to secure the release of five surviving sisters after one victim was killed by their captors, an episode that sparked debate about insecurity and the effectiveness of digital traceability systems
Meanwhile, Nigeria’s BVN database has continued to expand. By December 2025, BVN registrations had reached nearly 68 million, driven by Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) mandates linking BVN and NIN to bank accounts. Restrictions were placed on unlinked accounts from 2024, and banks have continued to push customers toward full compliance ahead of tighter enforcement in 2026.
In September 2025, President Tinubu said the linkage of the National Identification Number with SIM cards has drastically reduced fraud and improved national security.
According to Tinubu the commission had enrolled over 126 million Nigerians, cleared a backlog of 2.5 million records, deployed over 800 mobile enrolment devices nationwide, and integrated with 125 partner agencies, including the Immigration Service, the Federal Inland Revenue Service, and the National Population Commission.
“We were negotiating with them on our phones”
For the abducted survivor, James, these policy debates feel painfully personal. He said he was fully aware of NIN, BVN, and SIM linkages long before his abduction.
“In Nigeria, these linkages are already part of everyday identification,” he said. “They connect phone numbers to real identities. That could have helped authorities track the kidnappers because we were negotiating with them using our personal phones.”
From his perspective, kidnapping is no longer an analogue crime. Communication happens digitally, and even when cash is involved, planning and coordination often rely on phones. As such he does not understand why kidnappers are comfortable enough to continue communicating on traceable networks.
“If phones or bank accounts were involved, the information could have been used to trace them faster,” he added.
How criminals exploit digital fragmentation
At the community level, the consequences of this fragmentation are evident. A Veteran Journalist and coordinator of the Kwara South Joint Security Network, Elder Olaitan Oyin Zubair, says kidnappers have learned how to operate in the gaps between Nigeria’s digital systems.
In 2025, the International Centre For Investigative Journalism reported that Kwara State recorded no fewer than 207 killings, 177 abductions in 10 months.
According to Zubair, ransom demands are often made through phone calls, while payments are sometimes routed through POS agents or delivered physically in remote locations. He said, theoretically, identity-linked SIM cards, bank accounts, and POS terminals should make such activities traceable.
“Telephone numbers used for ransom calls should raise alerts,” he said. “If payments go through POS, those transactions should be traceable because accounts now require NINs and other identification.”
In reality, however, these mechanisms rarely lead to arrests. Zubair said many kidnappers insist on cash precisely because it avoids digital detection. Even when authorities are informed early, responses are often delayed.
“Despite huge ransoms, sometimes between 30 and 100 million naira, the criminals usually disappear without a trace,” he said.
DPI and the case for interoperability
Reflection on his ordeal, James said the benefits of DPI should be practical rather than theoretical.
“Phone location tracking, transaction monitoring, and even social media activity could have helped find my location and speed up my rescue,” he said.
Despite his support for digital tools in fighting kidnapping, the survivor remains cautious about how personal data is used.
“There’s always a risk of misuse,” he said. “But if the data is used strictly for security and properly protected, it would be acceptable.”
A narrow but critical opportunity
Zubair, the coordinator of Kwara South Joint Security Network, believes recent banking reforms introduced in January 2026, particularly the tighter regulation of POS operators and cashless transactions, could reduce some avenues used by kidnappers. Still, he warns that criminals adapt quickly and will continue to prefer cash unless enforcement improves.
For him, DPI is not a silver bullet. Without faster response times, inter-agency collaboration, and technological adaptation, kidnappers will stay ahead.
“However, with the new banking regulations on January 1st, 2026, there’s hope. These policies, especially those targeting POS and cashless transactions, might begin to restrict how bandits receive money. If ransom is paid through a financial platform, it becomes easier to trace and arrest the bandits.
“But we must understand that these criminals prefer cash for a reason to avoid detection. While I believe the new banking system may help curb some of these activities, we still have a long way to go. The government and security agencies must do more to stay ahead of the criminals’ evolving tactics and technology”
For those who have lived through kidnapping, the hope is simple: that their experiences will push Nigeria to finally connect the systems it has already built.
“Yes, I support using digital data to prevent kidnapping,” the survivor said. “As long as it is done responsibly.”
Calls and messages to the spokesperson’s Acting Head of Public Affairs, Nnenna Ukoha, and the Head of Corporate Communications at the Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement System (NIBSS), Lilian Phido, were not responded to as of the time of filing this report.
This report is produced under the DPI Africa Journalism Fellowship Programme of the Media Foundation for West Africa and Co-Develop.
